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Abstract. This paper presents simulation-based relations for proba-
bilistic game structures. The first relation is called probabilistic alter-
nating simulation, and the second called probabilistic alternating for-
ward simulation, following the naming convention of Segala and Lynch.
We study these relations with respect to the preservation of properties
specified in probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic.
1 Introduction
Simulation relations [Mil89] have proved to be useful for comparing the behavior
of concurrent systems, which can be formally interpreted as labeled transition
systems. The study of logic characterization of simulation is to build its connec-
tion to a modal or temporal logic which can be used to formulate some interest-
ing properties. Soundness of logic characterization requires simulation preserve
the satisfaction of logic formulas, while completeness shows the relation has the
same strength as the logic. Intuitively, the fact that one state s1 simulates an-
other state s2 can be used to establish the relation that any possible behavior
of s1 is also possible on s2. Thus it can preserve certain desirable properties
1
formulated in temporal logics like CTL [Eme90]. Simulation relations have set
up the foundations for constructing correct abstractions.
Related work. Segala and Lynch [SL95] extend the classical notions of simula-
tion for probabilistic automata [Seg95b], a general extension of labeled transi-
tion systems which admits both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors.
Their main idea is to relate probability distributions over states, instead of re-
lating individual states. They show soundness of the logical characterization
of probabilistic simulation, which preserves probabilistic CTL formulas [Han94]
without negation and existential quantification. Segala introduces the notion
of probabilistic forward simulation, which relates states to probability distribu-
tions over states and is sound and complete for trace distribution precongru-
ence [Seg95a,LSV07]. Logic characterization of strong and weak probabilistic
bisimulation has been studied in [DGJP02,PS07].
Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman [AHK97,AHK02] define ATL (alternating-
time temporal logic) to generalize CTL for game structures by requiring each
1 For example, safety properties stating “nothing bad can happen”.
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path quantifier to be parametrized with a set of agents. Game structures are
more general than LTS, in the sense that they allow both collaborative and
adversarial behaviors of individual agents in a system, and ATL can be used
to express properties like “a set of agents can enforce a specific outcome of the
system”. Alternating refinement relations, in particular alternating simulation,
are introduced later in [AHKV98]. Alternating simulation is a natural game-
theoretic interpretation of the classical simulation in two-player games. Logic
characterization of this simulation concentrates on a subset of ATL? formulas
where negations are only allowed at proposition level and all path quantifiers
are parametrized by a prefixed set of agents A. This sublogic of ATL? contains
all formulas expressing the properties the agents in A can enforce no matter
what the other agents do. Alur et al. [AHKV98] have proved both soundness
and completeness of the logic characterization.
Our contribution. In this apper, we introduce two notions of simulation for prob-
abilistic game structures – probabilistic alternating simulation and forward sim-
ulation, following the aforementioned results [Seg95a,SL95,AHKV98]. We prove
the soundness of logical characterization of probabilistic alternating simulation
relations, by showing that they preserve a fragment of a probabilistic extension
of ATL.
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly
explain some basic notations that are used throughout the paper in Sect. 2.
Sect. 3 introduces the notion of probabilistic game structures and the defini-
tion of probabilistic executions. In Sect. 4 we present PATL an extension of the
alternating-time temporal logic [AHK02] for probabilistic systems, and roughly
discuss its model checking problem. We define probabilistic alternating simula-
tion and forward simulation in Sect. 5, and show their soundness for preserving
properties specified in PATL in Sect. 6. Probabilistic alternating bisimulation is
shortly discussed in Sect. 7. We conclude the paper with some future research
topics in Sect. 8.
2 Preliminaries
This section contains basic notions that are used in the technical part. Let S be a
set. A discrete probabilistic distribution ∆ over S is a function of type S → [0, 1],
satisfying
∑
s∈S ∆(s) = 1. We write D(S) for the set of all such distributions.
For a set S′ ⊆ S, define ∆(S′) = ∑s∈S′ ∆(s). Given two distributions ∆1, ∆2
and p ∈ [0, 1], ∆1⊕p∆2 is a function of type S → [0, 1] defined as ∆1⊕p∆2(s) =
p·∆1(s)+(1−p)·∆2(s) for all s ∈ S. Obviously,∆1⊕p∆2 is also a distribution. We
further extend this notion by combining a set of distributions {∆i}i∈I ordered
by an indexed set {pi}i∈I into a distribution
∑
i∈I pi∆i, where pi ∈ [0, 1] for all
i ∈ I and ∑i∈I pi = 1. s is called a point distribution satisfying s(s) = 1 and
s(t) = 0 for all t 6= s. Let ∆ ∈ D(S), write d∆e for the support of ∆ as the set
{s ∈ S | ∆(s) > 0}.
Let S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn, then s ∈ S is a vector of length n. We may
also write s = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉, with s(i) = si ∈ Si. Given a finite sequence
α = s1s2 . . . sn ∈ S∗, write last(α) for sn. Let S′ ⊆ S, then α | S′ is a subsequence
of α with exactly the elements not in S′ removed. Given L ⊆ S∗, write L | S′
for the set {(α | S′) | α ∈ L}.
3 Probabilistic Game Structures
Assume a set of players Σ = {1, 2, . . . , k}. A probabilistic game structure (PGS)
G is defined as a tuple 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉, where
– S is a finite set of states, with s0 the initial state,
– Act = Act1× Act2×· · ·× Actk is a set of joint actions, where Acti is the set
of actions for player i = 1, . . . , k,
– L : S → 2Prop is the labelling function,
– δ : S × Act→ D(S) is a transition function.
A play ρ is a (finite or infinite) sequence s0a1s1a2s2 . . ., such that ai ∈ Act and
δ(si−1,ai)(si) > 0 for all i. Write |ρ| for the length of a run ρ, which is the number
of transitions in ρ, and |ρ| =∞ if ρ is infinite. We write ρ(i) for the i-th state in ρ
starting from 0, and ρ[i, j] for the subsequence starting from i-th state and ending
at the j-th state, provided 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |ρ|. Note that the players choose their
next moves simultaneously, but their moves may or may not be cooperative.
If on state s each player i performs action ai, then δ(s, 〈a1, a2, . . . ak〉) is the
distribution for the next reachable states. In the following discussion, we fix a
probabilistic game structure G.
We assume that the transition relation is total on the set Act. Note that this
does not pose any limitation on the expressiveness of the model. If an action
c ∈ Acti of player i is not supposed to be enabled on state s for player i, we
may find another action c′ ∈ Acti and define c to have the same effect as c′
on s. Since player i knows the current state, he also knows the set of actions
available to him, so that as a rational player he will not choose actions that are
not enabled. This allows such models to express systems in which on some states
the available (joint) actions are proper subsets of Act.2 We may even disable a
particular player on a state. A player i is disabled on s if δ(s,a) = δ(s,a′) for all
action vectors a,a′ ∈ Act satisfying a(j) = a′(j) for all j 6= i. A PGS is turn-
based if all but one player is disabled on s for all s ∈ S. A probabilistic game
structure can be regarded as a generalization of a concurrent game structure
of [AHK02]. From a state s ∈ S, each player i may choose an action from Acti
and together they resolve the nondeterminism. On the other hand, a PGS is
more stratified on external actions than some of the existing models.3
2 In the literature some authors encode available actions for player i as a function of
type S → 2Acti \ {∅}.
3 For example, a one-player PGS resembles a reactive system of [vGSS95], and a two-
player turn-based PGS (assuming they alternately act) loosely simulates a simple
probabilistic automaton [Seg95b], in the way that one player performs external ac-
tions and the other resolves nondeterminism after the previous player’s move is done.
A strategy of a player i ∈ Σ is a function of type S+ → D(Acti). We
write ΠGi for the set of strategies of player i in G.4 A play ρ is compatible
with an i-strategy pii, if ak(i) ∈ dpii(ρ[0, k − 1]|S)e for all k ≤ |ρ|. Given a
vector of strategies pi ∈ ΠG1 ×ΠG2 × · · · ×ΠG|Σ|, a run ρ is compatible with pi if
ak(i) ∈ dpi(i)(ρ[0, k−1]|S)e for all k ≤ |ρ| and i = 1, . . . , k. Write G(pi, s) for the
set of infinite plays compatible with every strategy in pi starting from s ∈ S, and
G∗(pi, s) the set of finite plays in G that are compatible with pi starting from s.
The set of finite plays compatible to a strategy vector pi is also called a set
of cones [Seg95b], with each finite play α representing the set of infinite plays
prefixed by α. Given a state s0 ∈ S, we can derive the probability for every mem-
ber in S+ compatible with pi, by recursively defining a function PrG(pi,s0) from
S+ to [0, 1] as follows. This function PrG(pi,s0) can be further generalized as the
probability measure to the σ-field FG,pi,s0 ⊆ G(pi, s0) which is a unique extension
from the set of cones G∗(pi, s) closed by countable union and complementation,
in a way similar to [Seg95b]:
– PrG(pi,s0)(s0) = 1,
– PrG(pi,s0)(α·s) = PrG(pi,s0)(α)·δ(last(α), 〈pi(1)(α),pi(2)(α), . . . ,pi(k)(α)〉)(s),
where δ(s, 〈∆1, ∆2, . . . ,∆k〉) is a distribution over states derived from δ and the
vector of action distributions defined by
δ(s, 〈∆1, . . . ,∆k〉) =
∑
i∈{1,...,k},ai∈d∆ie
∆1(a1) · . . . ·∆k(ak) · δ(s, 〈a1, . . . , ak〉).
Given A ⊆ Σ, sometimes we write pi(A) for a vector of |A| strategies {pii}i∈A,
and Π(A) for the set of all such strategy vectors. Write A for Σ \ A. Given
A ∩ A′ = ∅, strategy vectors pi ∈ Π(A) and pi′ ∈ Π(A′), pi ∪ pi′ is the vector of
strategies {pii}i∈A ∪ {pi′j}j∈A′ that combines pi and pi′.
We also define strategies of finite depth by restricting the size of their do-
mains, by writing pi ∈ ΠG,ni as a level-n strategy, i.e., pi is a function from traces
of states with length up to n (i.e., the set
⋃
m∈{1,2,...,n} S
m) to D(Acti). Given a
set of strategies {pii}i∈I of the same domain, and {pi}i∈I with
∑
i∈I pi = 1, let
pi =
∑
i∈I pi · pii be a (combined) strategy, by letting pi(γ) =
∑
i∈I pi · pii(γ) for
all γ in the domain.
We overload the function δ as from a state in S and a vector of strategies
(of any depth n) pi ∈ ΠG,n1 ×ΠG,n2 × · · · ×ΠG,n|Σ| to D(S), by δ(s,pi) = δ(s,a),
where a(i) = pi(i)(s) for all i ∈ Σ. Note each a(i) is a distribution over Acti. We
further lift δ to be a transition function from state distributions and strategy
vectors to state distributions, by
δ(∆,pi) =
∑
s∈d∆e
∆(s) · δ(s,pi)
4 Sometimes we omit G, if it is clear from the context.
Probabilistic Executions
We settle the nondeterminism in a probabilistic game structure by fixing the
behaviours of all players represented as strategies. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 be a
PGS, define a probabilistic execution E as in the form of 〈E,∆,LE , δE〉, where
– E ⊆ S+ is the set of finite plays starting form a state in the initial dis-
tribution and compatible with δE , i.e., s0s1 . . . sn ∈ E if s0 ∈ d∆e, and
δE(s0 . . . si)(s0 . . . si+1) > 0 for all 0 ≤ i < n,
– ∆ ∈ D(S) an (initial) distribution,
– LE is the labelling function defined as LE(e) = L(last(e)) for all e ∈ E,
– δE : E → D(E) is a (deterministic) transition relation, satisfying for all
e ∈ E there exists a (level 1) strategy vector pie, such that δE(e)(e · t) =
δ(last(e),pie)(t) if t ∈ dδ(last(e),pie)e, and 0 otherwise.
A probabilistic execution of G can be uniquely determined by a strategy vector
pi starting from a state distribution. Given ∆ ∈ D(S), define E(G,pi, ∆) as the
probabilistic execution 〈Epi, ∆,Lpi, δpi〉, with Epi = ⋃s∈d∆e G∗(pi, s) | S for the
set of compatible finite plays, Lpi defined as Lpi(e) = L(last(e)) for all e ∈ Epi,
and δpi(e) = δ(last(e),pie) for all e ∈ Epi, where pie(i) = pi(i)(e) for all i ∈ Σ.
Intuitively, a probabilistic execution resembles the notion of the same name
proposed by Segala and Lynch [Seg95b,SL95], and in this case the strategies of
the players altogether represent a single adversary of Segala and Lynch.
4 Probabilistic Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
In this section we introduce a probabilistic version of alternating-time temporal
logic [AHK02], which focuses on the players ability to enforce a property with an
expected probability. Let Prop be a nonempty set of propositions. Probabilistic
alternating-time temporal logic (PATL) formulas [CL07] are defined as follows.
φ := p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 〈〈A〉〉./αψ
ψ :=©φ | φ1U≤kφ2
where A ⊆ Σ is a set of players, ./∈ {<,>,≤,≥}, k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, p ∈ Prop, and
α ∈ [0, 1]. We also write ψ1U ψ2 for ψ1U≤∞ψ2 as ‘unbounded until’. The symbols
φ, φ1, φ2 are state formulas, and ψ is a path formula. We omit the syntactic
sugars in our definition, such as true ≡ p ∨ ¬p and false ≡ p ∧ ¬p for some
p ∈ Prop, φ1 ∨ φ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2) for state formulas. The path modality R
can be expressed by U without introducing negations into path formulas, as we
will show later in this section. One may also define 2≤kψ ≡ false R≤kψ, and
3≤kψ ≡ true U≤kψ, where k ∈ N∪{∞}. The set of PATL formulas L are the set
of state formulas as defined above. We have the semantics of the path formulas
and the state formulas defined as follows.
– ρ |= φ iff G, ρ(0) |= φ where φ is a state formula,
– ρ |=©φ iff ρ(1) |= φ,
– ρ |= φ1U≤kφ2 iff there exists i ≤ k such that ρ(j) |= φ1 for all 0 ≤ j < i and
ρ(i) |= φ2,
– G, s |= p iff p ∈ L(s),
– G, s |= ¬φ iff G, s 6|= φ,
– G, s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff G, s |= φ1 and G, s |= φ2,
– G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉./α ψ iff there exists a vector of strategies pi ∈ Π(A), such that for
all vectors of strategies pi′ ∈ Π(A) for players in A, we have PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈
G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) ./ α,
where ρ is an infinite play in G, α ∈ [0, 1], φ, φ1, φ2 are state formulas, and ψ
is a path formula. Equivalently, given S the state space of a probabilistic game
structure G, we write JφK for {s ∈ S | s |= φ} for all PATL (state) formulas
φ. For ∆ ∈ D(S), we write ∆ |= φ iff d∆e ⊆ JφK. Intuitively, G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉≥αψ
describes the ability of players in A to cooperatively enforce ψ with probability
at least α in s.
The following lemma is directly from the PATL semantics. If a group of users
A can enforce a linear-time temporal logic formula ψ to hold with probability at
least α with strategies pi ∈ Π(A), then at the same time pi enforces the formula
¬ψ to hold with probability at most 1− α. To simplify the notation, we let ‘∼’
denote changes on directions of the symbols in {<,>,≤,≥}, e.g., symbol ≥˜ for
≤, ≤˜ for ≥, >˜ for <, and <˜ for >.
Lemma 1. G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉./αψ iff G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉.˜/1−α¬ψ
Proof. (sketch) For all pi ∈ Π(A) and pi′ ∈ Π(A), s ∈ S and ψ a path formula,
we have PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) + PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪
pi′, s) | ρ |= ¬ψ}) = 1. Therefore PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) ./ α
iff PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ¬ψ}).˜/1 − α, for all α ∈ [0, 1] and
./∈ {<,>,≤,≥}. uunionsq
Therefore, the path quantifier R (release) can be expressed by the existing PATL
syntax, in the way that 〈〈A〉〉./αφ1R≤kφ2 ≡ 〈〈A〉〉.˜/1−α(¬φ1)U≤k(¬φ2), where both
¬φ1 and ¬φ2 are state formulas.
On Model Checking of PATL
In this section we briefly survey the results in the literature related to PATL
model checking. Given a PATL formula in the form of 〈〈A〉〉./αψ(φ1, . . . , φn),
regarding Jφ1K, . . . , JφnK as the sets of states satisfying state formulas φ1, . . . , φn,
a standard way to solve this problem is to determine the maximal or minimal
probability that the players in A can enforce the LTL formula ψ(φ1, . . . , φn). In
the following we write ψ for ψ(φ1, . . . , φn) without further confusions.
LTL properties are special cases of ω-regular winning objectives [Tho91] in
two-player concurrent (zero-sum) games [dAM04,CdAH06]. In such games one
may group a set of players A ⊆ Σ into a single protagonist and A into a single
antagonist. Given an ω-regular winning objective ξ and starting from a state
Fig. 1. An example showing that player I can guarantee to satisfy 3φ with probability
α for all 0 ≤ α < 1, but he cannot ensure that property with probability 1.
s ∈ S, the protagonist plays with a strategy trying to maximize the probabil-
ity for a play to satisfy ξ while the antagonist tries to minimize the probabil-
ity. In such a game there always exists a unique value in [0, 1], on which both
players have strategies to guarantee (or infinitely approach) their best perfor-
mances, regardless of the strategies played by their opponents. Such a supre-
mum value (or infinum value, as for the antagonist) is called the value of the
game [Mar98,dAM04]. In a probabilistic multi-player game, we let a group of
players A ⊆ Σ be a single player, and A be the other, and the supremal proba-
bility for A to enforce such an LTL formula ψ starting from a given state s ∈ S
can be uniquely determined. This value is defined as
〈A〉ψ(s) =
⊔
pi∈Π(A)
l
pi′∈Π(A)
PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ})
Example 1. Fig. 1 gives a PGS with two players {I, II}, initial state s0, ActI =
{a1, a2} and ActII = {b1, b2}. Note that this PGS is deterministic, i.e, no prob-
abilities in its transitions. We assume that the only available transitions from
s1 and s2 are self-loops, and the other transition relations are as depicted in
the graph. Suppose player I wants to maximize the probability to enforce the
property 3φ, and player II aims to minimize it.
Since the strategies applied on s1 and s2 do not matter, we focus on the
choices of actions from both players on s0. We first focus on memoryless strate-
gies, and let player I’s strategy pi1 gives pi1(γ)(a1) = p and pi1(γ)(a2) = 1 − p
for all γ ∈ S+. Similarly we let II assign probability q to b1 and 1 − q to b2 all
the time. This produces an infinite tree, on which we write xs0(I) for the actual
probability I can achieve 3φ from s0, given the above memoryless strategies.
(Note that xs1(I) = 0 and xs2(I) = 1 in all cases.) This establishes an equation
which further derives xs0(I) =
(1−p)+(2p−1)q
(1−p)+pq . A simple analysis shows that when
p approaches 1, the minimal value of xs0(I) approaches 1 as well, for all choices
of q. That is, there exists a strategy for player I to enforce 3φ with probability
1 − ε for all ε > 0. However, if player I chooses p = 1, player II may set q = 0
so that a play will be trapped in s0 for ever that yields xs0(I) = 0. The result
of [dAM04] shows that in this case player I cannot do better even with general
(history dependent) strategies. In fact there are no strategies for player I to
enforce 3φ with probability 1. uunionsq
Indeed, 〈A〉ψ(s) can be almost the best, i.e., we have G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉≥ 〈A〉ψ(s)−εψ
for all ε > 0 [dAHK98]. Nevertheless, the quantitative version of determi-
nacy [Mar98] ensures that for all LTL formulas ψ and s ∈ S, we have
〈A〉ψ(s) + 〈A〉¬ψ(s) = 1
The PATL model checking problems can be solved by calculating the values
〈A〉ψs(s) for each state s, where each local objective ψs related to s might
be distinct. The algorithms of [dAM04] define monotonic functions of type
(S → [0, 1]) → (S → [0, 1]) to arbitrarily approach a vector {〈A〉ψs(s)}s∈S
in a game structure with finite state space S with respect to an ω-regular win-
ning objective ψ. Within each step one has to go through O(|S|) matrix games,
and each iteration produces a unique fixed point. The algorithms on safety and
reachability objectives are special cases of solving stochastic games [RF91]. More
complex properties can be expressed as nested fixed points [dAM04]. Therefore,
the upper bound complexities become exponential to the size of the winning
objectives translated from LTL formulas. More recently, alternative algorithms
proposed in [CdAH06] prove that for quantitative games with ω-regular winning
objectives expressed as parity conditions, whether the values of a game is within
[r − , r + ] can be decided in NP ∩ coNP for all rational r ∈ [0, 1] and  > 0,
which improves the theoretical upper bound for estimating the optimal values.
Optimal Strategies
It has been shown in [dAM04] that for safety games there always exist optimal
strategies for the protagonists, however for reachability games it is not always
the case. As shown in example 1, player I has no optimal strategy to enforce
3φ with probability 1 on s0 even though 〈I〉φ(s0) = 1. Based on similar proof
strategies applied in [dAM04], we examine the existence of optimal strategies on
winning objectives expressed as path formulas of PATL on a state.
Lemma 2. Let s be a state, ψ be a path formula, and A the set of protagonists.
1. If ψ is of the form©φ, φ1U≤kφ2, φ1R≤kφ2, or φ1Rφ2 with k ∈ N, there always
exists a joint optimal strategy for A that enforces ψ on s with probability at
least 〈A〉ψ(s).
2. If ψ is of the form φ1Uφ2, there always exists a joint -optimal strategy for
A that enforces ψ on s with probability at least 〈A〉ψ(s)− , for all  > 0.
For the prove of Lemma 2 we rely on the representation of a solution for a winning
objective in quantitative game µ-calculus [dAM04]. For the sake of readability
we leave the whole proof in the appendix.
The next result proves the existence of a joint A strategy to enforce an PATL
path formula with probability greater than α if there exists a joint strategy
to enforce that formula with probability greater than α against an optimal A
strategy.
Lemma 3. Let ψ be a PATL path formula and pi′ be a joint optimal strategy for
the antagonists A on state s, if there exists a joint strategy pi for the protagonists
A such that PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) > α, then G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉>αψ.
Proof. Since pi′ is the optimal strategy for the antagonists, we have for all joint
strategies pi′′, PrG(pi′′∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi′′ ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) ≤ 〈A〉ψ(s), then we
have 〈A〉ψ(s) > α. If there exists an optimal joint strategy for A then we have
s |= 〈〈A〉〉≥〈A〉ψ(s)ψ, which implies s |= 〈〈A〉〉>αψ. Otherwise by Lemma 2 there
exists an -optimal joint strategy for A with small  > 0 to enforce ψ with
probability at least 〈A〉ψ(s)−  > α. This also gives us s |= 〈〈A〉〉>αψ. uunionsq
This result does not hold if we replace the operator “>” by “≥” for unbounded
until U. This is because if there does not exist a joint optimal strategy for A to
enforce φ1Uφ2 with probability ≥ α, we have no space to insert a tiny  > 0 as we
did in the above proof. For the fragment of path formulas without unbounded
until, we extend the results for ≥, by the fact that optimal joint strategies for A
always exist for these path modalities, as shown by Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. For path formulas ψ in the form of ©φ or φ1U≤kφ2 and optimal
strategies pi′ for the antagonists A on state s, if there exists a joint strategy pi
for the protagonists A such that PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) ./ α,
then G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉./αψ, where k ∈ N and ./∈ {>,≥}.
Proof. Since there exists joint strategies for A against A’s optimal strategies,
we have 〈A〉¬ψ(s).˜/1− α, therefore 〈A〉ψ(s) ./ α by determinacy. By Lemma 2
there always exist optimal strategies for A to enforce ψ with probability ./ α if
ψ is in the form of ©φ or φ1U≤kφ2. uunionsq
A-PATL
We define a sublogic of PATL by focusing on a particular set of players. Similar
to the approach of [AHKV98], we only allow negations to appear on the level
of propositions. Let A ⊆ Σ, an A-PATL formula φ is a state formula defined
as follows:
φ := p | ¬p | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉./α© φ | 〈〈A′〉〉./αφ1U≤kφ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉>αφ1Uφ2
where k ∈ N, ./∈ {>,≥} and A′ ⊆ A. Write LA for the set of A-PATL formulas.
An A-PATL formula describes a property that players in A are able to ensure
with a minimal expectation by their joint strategies. Note that we only allow
‘> α’ in the construction of unbounded until.
5 Probabilistic Alternating Simulation Relations
We define probabilistic versions of alternating simulation [AHKV98]. An alter-
nating simulation is a two-step simulation. For a sketch, suppose state s is sim-
ulated by state t. In the first step the protagonists choose their actions on t
to simulate the behaviour of the protagonists on s, and in the second step the
antagonists choose actions on s to respond the behaviour of the antagonists on t.
This somehow results in a simulation-like relation, so that for a certain property
the protagonists can enforce on s, they can also enforce it on t. To this end we
split Σ into two groups of players — one group of protagonist and the other
group of antagonist. Subsequently, we consider only the two-player case in a
probabilistic game structure — player I for the protagonist and player II for the
antagonist, since what we can achieve in the two-player case naturally extends to
a result in systems with two complementary sets of players, i.e., A∪A = Σ. For
readability we also write the transition functions as δ(s, a1, a2) and δ(s, pi1, pi2)
for δ(s, 〈a1, a2〉) and δ(s, 〈pi1, pi2〉), respectively.
Let S, T be two sets and R ⊆ S × T be a relation, then R ⊆ D(S)×D(T ) is
defined by ∆RΘ if there exists a weight function w : S × T → [0, 1] satisfying
–
∑
t∈T w(s, t) = ∆(s) for all s ∈ S,
–
∑
s∈S w(s, t) = Θ(t) for all t ∈ T ,
– sR t for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T with w(s, t) > 0.
Note in this definition, it is equivalent to have
∑
t∈dΘe w(s, t) = ∆(s) for all
s ∈ S, and∑s∈d∆e w(s, t) = Θ(t) for all t ∈ T . Since w can only assign non-zero
values to the states in the support of ∆ or Θ. If w(s, t) > 0 for some s 6∈ d∆e and
t ∈ T , then we would have ∑t∈T w(s, t) > 0 = ∆(s), which is a contradiction.
The followings are several properties of lifted relations.
Lemma 5. (inverse) Let R−1 ⊆ T × S be the inverse of R ⊆ S × T , then for
all ∆ ∈ D(S) and Θ ∈ D(T ), ∆RΘ iff ΘR−1∆.
Proof. By taking the inverse of the weight function. uunionsq
Lemma 6. Let ∆ ∈ D(S), ∆′ ∈ D(S′), and R a relation on S. If ∆R∆′, then
1. If there exist ∆1, ∆2, · · · ∈ D(S) and an index set {pi}I satisfying
∑
i∈I pi =
1 and ∆ =
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i, then there exist ∆′1, ∆′2 · · · ∈ D(S′) such that ∆′ =∑
i∈I pi ·∆′i, and ∆iR∆′i for all i ∈ I.
2. If there exist ∆′1, ∆
′
2, · · · ∈ D(S′) and an index set {pi}I satisfying
∑
i∈I pi =
1 and ∆′ =
∑
i∈I pi ·∆′i, then there exist ∆1, ∆2 · · · ∈ D(S) such that ∆ =∑
i∈I pi ·∆i, and ∆iR∆′i for all i ∈ I.
Proof. We prove the second part, and the first part is similar. Let ∆′ =
∑
i∈I pi ·
∆′i, then define ∆i for each i ∈ I by ∆i(s) =
∑
s′∈S′ w(s, s
′) · ∆′i(s′)∆′(s′) for all s ∈ S.
Now we can check that
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i(s) = ∆(s) for all s, i.e., ∆ =
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i.
To show that ∆iR∆′i, we define a weight function wi : S × S′ → [0, 1] by
for all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, wi(s, s′) = w(s, s′) · ∆
′
i(s
′)
∆′(s′) . Consider the following
conditions.
1. wi(s, s
′) > 0 implies w(s, s′) > 0, therefore sRs′.
2. For all s ∈ S, we have ∑s′∈S′ wi(s, s′) =∑s′∈S′ w(s, s′) · ∆′i(s′)∆′(s′) = ∆i(s),
3. For all s′ ∈ S′, we have∑
s∈S wi(s, s
′) =
∑
s∈S w(s, s
′) · ∆′i(s′)∆′(s′) = ∆
′
i(s
′)
∆′(s′) ·
∑
s∈S w(s, s
′) = ∆
′
i(s
′)
∆′(s′) ·
∆′(s′) = ∆′i(s
′).
uunionsq
Lemma 7. Let R be a relation on S and {pi}i∈I be an index set satisfying∑
i∈I pi = 1 and ∆iR∆′i for distributions ∆i, ∆′i ∈ D(S) for all i, then
∑
i∈I pi ·
∆iR
∑
i∈I pi ·∆′i.
Proof. W.l.o.g., let ∆i ∈ D(S) and ∆′i ∈ D(S′) for all i, and let wi be the
weight function for ∆iR∆′i. Define a new weight function w : S×S′ → [0, 1], by
w(s, s′) =
∑
i∈I pi · wi(s, s′).
– w(s, s′) > 0, then
∑
i∈I pi · wi(s, s′) > 0, i.e, there exists some i ∈ I such
that wi(s, s
′) > 0, which gives sRs′.
– For all s ∈ S, ∑s′∈S′ w(s, s′)
=
∑
s′∈S′
∑
i∈I pi · wi(s, s′)
=
∑
i∈I pi ·
∑
s′∈S′ wi(s, s
′)
=
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i(s).
– To show that for all s′ ∈ S′, ∑s∈S w(s, s′) =∑i∈I pi ·∆′i(s′) is similar.
This gives
∑
i∈I pi ·∆iR
∑
i∈I pi ·∆′i. uunionsq
Based on the notion of lifting, we define the probabilistic alternating sim-
ulation relation for player I that extends the alternating simulation relation
of [AHKV98]. The definition for player II can be made in a similar way.
Definition 1. Consider G,G′ as two probabilistic game structures. A probabilis-
tic alternating I-simulation v⊆ S × S′ is a relation satisfying if s v s′, then
– L(s) = L′(s′),
– for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that for all pi
′
2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there
exists pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(s, pi1, pi2)v δ′(s′, pi′1, pi′2).
Let R ⊆ S × S′ and R′ ⊆ S′ × S′′ be two relations, then R · R′ is a relation on
S×S′′ defined by s(R ·R′) s′′ if there exists s′ ∈ S′ such that sRs′ and s′R′s′′.
Lemma 8. (Transitivity of alternating simulation) Consider G,G′ and G′′ be
three probabilistic game structures. If v ⊆ S × S′ and v′ ⊆ S′ × S′′ are prob-
abilistic alternating I-simulations, then v · v′ is a probabilistic alternating I-
simulation on S × S′′.
Proof. (sketch) Let s v · v′ s′′, then by definition there exists s′ ∈ S′ such
that s v s′ and s′ v′ s′′. Therefore L(s) = L(s′) = L(s′′). Let pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I ,
then by definition there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I such that for all pi
′
2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II there
exists pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II such that δ(s, 〈pi1, pi2〉)vδ′(s′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉). By s′ v′ s′′, there
exists pi′′1 ∈ ΠG
′′,1
I such that for all pi
′′
3 ∈ ΠG
′′,1
II , there exists pi
′
3 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II
such that δ′(s′, 〈pi′1, pi′3〉)v′ δ′′(s′′, 〈pi′′1 , pi′′3 〉). Then from above there also exists
pi3 ∈ ΠG,1I such that δ(s, 〈pi1, pi3〉)vδ′(s′, 〈pi′1, pi′3〉). Write ∆ = δ(s, 〈pi1, pi3〉),
∆′ = δ′(s′, 〈pi′1, pi′3〉) and ∆′′ = δ′′(s′′, 〈pi′′1 , pi′′3 〉). we need to show that ∆v · v′∆′′.
Let w1 be a weight function for ∆v∆′ and w2 a weight function for ∆′v′∆′′,
define a new weight function w : S×S′′ → [0, 1], by w(s, s′′) =∑s′∈S′ w1(s,s′)·w2(s′,s′′)∆′(s′) .
Let s ∈ S and s′′ ∈ S′′.
– If w(s, s′′) > 0 then exists s′ ∈ d∆′e such that w1(s, s′) > 0 and w2(s′, s′′) >
0, which implies s v s′ and s′ v′ s′′. Therefore, s v · v′ s′′.
–
∑
s∈S w(s, s
′′)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
s′∈S′
w1(s,s
′)·w2(s′,s′′)
∆′(s′)
=
∑
s′∈S′
w2(s
′,s′′)
∆′(s′) ·
∑
s∈S w1(s, s
′)
=
∑
s′∈S′
w2(s
′,s′′)
∆′(s′) ·∆′(s′)
=
∑
s′∈S′ w2(s
′, s′′)
= ∆′′(s′′)
– Showing
∑
s′′∈S′′ w(s, s
′′) = ∆(s) is similar.
uunionsq
Lemma 8 can also be derived from the transitivity of probabilistic alternating
forward simulation (Corollary 1) and the fact that every probabilistic alternating
simulation is also a probabilistic alternating forward simulation (Lemma 11).
Based on the probabilistic forward simulation of Segala [Seg95a], and the
alternating simulation of Alur et al. [AHKV98], we propose the notion of proba-
bilistic alternating forward simulation. A forward simulation relates a state to a
distribution of states, which requires a different way of lifting. Let R ⊆ S×D(S)
be a relation, write R for the smallest relation satisfying ∆RΘ if there exists an
index set {pi}i∈I satisfying Σi∈Ipi = 1, such that ∆ = Σi∈Ipi ·si, Θ = Σi∈Ipi ·Θi
and siRΘi for all i. We call R the forward lifting of R. Forward lifting has the
following similar properties as the previous lifting.
Lemma 9. Let R be a relation on S×D(S) and {pi}i∈I be an index set satisfying∑
i∈I pi = 1 and ∆iR∆′i for distributions ∆i, ∆′i ∈ D(S) for all i, then
∑
i∈I pi ·
∆iR
∑
i∈I pi ·∆′i, where R is the forward lifting of R.
Lemma 10. Let ∆ ∈ D(S), ∆′ ∈ D(S′), and R a relation on S. If ∆R∆′, and
there exist ∆1, ∆2, · · · ∈ D(S) and an index set {pi}I satisfying
∑
i∈I pi = 1 and
∆ =
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i, then there exist ∆′1, ∆′2 · · · ∈ D(S′) such that ∆′ =
∑
i∈I pi ·∆′i,
and ∆iR∆′i for all i ∈ I, where R is the forward lifting of R.
Now we define the probabilistic alternating forward simulation relation for player
I, and the definition for player II can be made in a similar way.
Definition 2. Consider two probabilistic game structures G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉
and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉. A probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation
vf⊆ S ×D(S′) is a relation satisfying if s vf ∆′, then
– L(s) = L′(s′) for all s′ ∈ d∆′e,
Fig. 2. An example showing that probabilistic alternating forward simulation is strictly
weaker than probabilistic alternating simulation.
– for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that for all pi
′
2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there
exists pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(s, pi1, pi2)vf δ′(∆′, pi′1, pi′2).
Lemma 11. s v t implies s vf t.
This lemma says that every probabilistic alternating simulation is a probabilis-
tic forward simulation with a point distribution on the right hand side of the
relation. The other way does not hold, i.e., probabilistic alternating forward
simulation relates strictly more game structures than probabilistic alternating
simulation. In Fig. 2, we assume ActI and ActII are both singleton sets. One
may find that there are no states in the set {s′2, s′3, s′4, s′5} in Fig. 2(b) that can
simulate states s3 and s5 in Fig. 2(a). Therefore, we cannot establish a prob-
abilistic alternating simulation from s1 to s
′
1. However, s1 is related to s
′
1 by
probabilistic alternating forward simulation, since s3 (s5) can be related to a
uniform distribution over s′2 and s
′
3 (s
′
4 and s
′
5).
Before proceeding to the next step we introduce the following several auxil-
iary lemmas.
Lemma 12. Given {pi}i∈I with
∑
i∈I pi = 1, s ∈ S, {pii}i∈I ⊆ ΠG,1I and pi ∈
ΠG,1II , we have δ(s,
∑
i∈I pi · pii, pi) =
∑
i∈I pi · δ(s, pii, pi).
Proof. Let t ∈ S, then we have
δ(s,
∑
i∈I pi · pii, pi)(t)= δ(s,
∑
i∈I pi · pii(s), pi(s))(t)
=
∑
a1∈Act1
∑
a2∈Act2
∑
i∈I pi · pii(a1) · pi(a2) · δ(s, a1, a2)(t)
=
∑
i∈I pi · [
∑
a1∈Act1
∑
a2∈Act2 pii(a1) · pi(a2) · δ(s, a1, a2)(t)]
=
∑
i∈I pi · δ(s, pii(s), pi(s))(t)
=
∑
i∈I pi · δ(s, pii, pi)(t)
uunionsq
Lemma 13. Let G and G′ be two game structures, {∆i}i∈I be a set of distri-
butions, {pii}i∈I a set of level 1 I-strategies, pi ∈ ΠG
′,1
II and {pi}i∈I satisfies∑
i∈I pi = 1, we have δ(
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i, pi′, pi) =
∑
i∈I pi · δ(∆i, pii, pi), where pi′ is a
level 1 I strategy defined by
pi′(s) =
∑
i∈I
pi ·∆i(s) · pii(s)∑
i∈I pi ·∆i(s)
Proof. Write LHS = δ(
∑
i∈I pi · ∆i, pi′, pi) and RHS =
∑
i∈I pi · δ(∆i, pii, pi),
we need to show for all t ∈ S, LHS(t) = RHS(t). Write ∆ for the distribution∑
i∈I pi ·∆i. Let t ∈ S, then by definition
LHS(t)=
∑
s∈d∆e
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i(s)δ(s, pi′, pi)(t)
=
∑
s∈d∆e∆(s) · δ(s, pi′, pi)(t)
=
∑
s∈d∆e∆(s) · δ(s, pi′(s), pi(s))(t)
=
∑
s∈d∆e∆(s) · δ(s,
∑
j∈I
pj ·∆j(s)pij(s)
∆(s) , pi(s))(t)
=
∑
s∈d∆e∆(s) ·
∑
j∈I
pj ·∆j(s)
∆(s) δ(s, pij(s), pi(s))(t) By Lemma 12
=
∑
s∈d∆e ·
∑
j∈I pj ·∆j(s) · δ(s, pij(s), pi(s))(t)
=
∑
j∈I pj ·
∑
s∈d∆e ·∆j(s) · δ(s, pij(s), pi(s))(t)
=
∑
j∈I pj ·
∑
s∈d∆je ·∆j(s) · δ(s, pij(s), pi(s))(t)
=
∑
j∈I pj · δ(∆i, pii, pi)(t) By definition
= RHS(t)
uunionsq
The next result shows that the definition of forward simulation also works
on the lifted relation.
Lemma 14. If ∆vfΘ, then for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that
for all pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there exists pi
′
1 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(∆,pi1, pi′1)vf δ(Θ, pi2, pi′2).
Proof. By definition there exists a set {pi}i∈I such that ∆ =
∑
i∈I pi · si, Θ =∑
i∈I pi · Θi and si vf Θi. Let pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I be a (mixed) I-strategy. Then by
definition, for all i ∈ I there exists pii ∈ ΠG
′,1
I such that for all pi
′
i ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there
exists pi′′i ∈ ΠG,1II such that δ(si, pi1, pi′′i )vfδ(si, pii, pi′i). Now we take pi2 defined
by pi2(s) =
∑
i∈I pi
Θi(s)
Θ(s) pii(s) for all s be the required (level 1) I-strategy.
Let pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , we prove as follows the existence of another II-strategy
pi′1 ∈ ΠG,1II that satisfies δ(∆,pi1, pi′1)vf δ(Θ, pi2, pi′2). For each i ∈ I, by si vf
Θi, there exists pi
′′
i ∈ ΠG,1II satisfying δ(si, pi1, pi′′i )vfδ(Θi, pi2, pi′2). Then we have∑
i∈I pi ·δ(si, pi1, pi′i)vf
∑
i∈I pi ·δ(Θi, pi2, pi′2), by Lemma 7. The required (mixed)
II-strategy pi′1 is defined by pi
′
1(s) =
∑
i∈I pi
si(s)
∆(s)pi
′′
i (s) for all s, and the result
follows from Lemma 13. uunionsq
Consequently, we are able to show that lifted probabilistic alternating forward
simulations are transitive.
Corollary 1. (Transitivity of alternating forward simulation) Let vf be a prob-
abilistic alternating forward I-simulation, then ∆1vf∆2 and ∆2vf∆3 implies
∆1vf∆3.
6 Forward I-Simulation is Sound for I-PATL
This section establishes the main result of the paper: a relationship between
probabilistic forward I-simulation and I-PATL formulas. Recall that a I-PATL
formula has only strategy modalities 〈〈I〉〉 and 〈〈∅〉〉, and negations are only al-
lowed to appear immediately before the propositions. For readability we write
〈〈I〉〉 for 〈〈{I}〉〉. Let G and G′ be two PGSs, ∆ ∈ D(S) and ∆′ ∈ D(S′) such that
∆vf∆′ by a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. We need to show
that ∆ |= φ implies ∆′ |= φ for all I-PATL formula φ.
Our proof relies on the existence of player II’s optimal strategies for path
formulas as winning objectives (as shown in Sect. 4). Suppose pi1 is a I strategy
that enforces φ, we construct another I strategy pi′1 that simulates pi all along the
way, in the sense that provided the optimal II strategy pi′2 there exists another II
strategy pi2 such that the probabilistic execution E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) will be “simu-
lated” by the probabilistic execution E(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′). Since pi1 enforces φ, the
E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) satisfies φ, we show that it is also the case of E(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′).
Let E = 〈E,∆,LE , δE〉 and E ′ = 〈E′, ∆′,LE′ , δE′〉 be probabilistic executions
of G and G′, respectively. Also let vf⊆ S ×D(S′) be a probabilistic alternating
forward I-simulation. We say the pair (E , E ′) is an instance of simulation, by
writing E v E ′, if there exists a (simulation) relation v′⊆ E ×D(E′), such that
– ∆v′∆′,
– if e v′ Θ then last(e) vf last(Θ),
– if e v′ Θ then δE(e)vδE′(Θ),
where last(Θ) is a distribution satisfying last(Θ)(s) =
∑
last(e)=sΘ(e). A few
properties of the relation v′ are as follows.
Lemma 15. 1. ∆v′Θ implies δE(∆)v′δE′(Θ).
2. ∆v′Θ and ∆ = ∆1 ⊕α ∆2 with α ∈ [0, 1], then there exist Θ1, Θ2 such that
∆1v′Θ1, ∆2v′Θ2, and Θ = Θ1 ⊕α Θ2.
A proof of part (1) is by definition of v′ and Lemma 9, and part (2) holds by
Lemma 10.
Let ∆ be a state distribution of G, ∆′ be a state distribution of G′, and
∆vf∆′. Suppose pi1 is a I strategy in G that enforces φ with probability at least
α, and pi′2 is a II strategy in G′, step-by-step we establish a I strategy pi′1 and a II
strategy pi2, so that the probabilistic executution decided by pi1 and pi2 from ∆
will be simulated by the probabilistic executution decided by pi1 and pi2 from ∆
′.
Lemma 16. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉 be two PGSs.
If ∆vf∆′, then for all pi1 ∈ ΠGI and pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′
II , there exists pi
′
1 ∈ ΠG
′
I and
pi2 ∈ ΠGII, such that E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) v E ′(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′).
Proof. We construct pii1 and pi
i
2 as a level 1 strategies of player I and II for
all i ∈ N, and define pi′1(γ · s) = pi|γ|+11 (s) for all γ ∈ S∗ and s ∈ S. And
pi2(γ · s) = pi|γ|+12 (s) for all γ ∈ (S′)∗ and s ∈ S′.
Since ∆vf∆′, then by Lemma 14, there exists pi11 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that for all
pi′′2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II there exists pi
′′′
2 ∈ ΠG,1II such that δ(∆,pi1, pi′′′2 )vfδ(∆′, pi11 , pi′′2 ). So if
we take the first level of pi′2, there exists pi
1
2 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(∆,pi1, pi12)vfδ(∆′, pi11 , pi′2).
We define ∆2 ∈ D(S2) by ∆2(s1s2) = ∆(s1)·δ(s1, pi1, pi12)(s2), and ∆′2 ∈ D((S′)2)
in a similar way. We also ‘truncate’ the strategy pi1 by defining pi1(2) ∈ ΠG,1I
in the way that pi1(2)(s) =
∑
s′∈d∆e∆(s
′) · pi1(s′s). And we define pi′2(2) in a
similar way.
Suppose we have ∆n, ∆
′
n ∈ D(Sn), and pi1(n) ∈ ΠG,1I , and pi′2(s) ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , in
the similar way to above, we construct pin1 and pi
n
2 , such that δ(∆,pi1(n), pi
n
2 )vfδ(∆′, pin1 , pi′2(n)).
Then we define ∆n+1 ∈ D(Sn+1) by ∆n+1(s1 . . . snsn+1) = ∆n(s1 . . . sn) ·
δ(sn, pi1(n), pi
n
2 )(sn+1), and∆
′
n+1 ∈ D((S′)n+1) by∆′n+1(s1 . . . snsn+1) = ∆′n(s1 . . . sn)·
δ(s′n, pi
n
1 , pi2(n))(sn+1). We then define pi1(n + 1) ∈ ΠG,1I by pi1(n + 1)(s) =∑
γ∈d∆ne∆n(γ)·pi1(γ·s), and pi′2(n+1) ∈ Π
G′,1
II by pi
′
2(n+1)(s) =
∑
γ∈d∆′ne∆
′
n(γ)·
pi′2(γ · s).
It is easily verifiable that we have established two probabilistic executions
satisfying E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) v E ′(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′), by taking a probabilistic alter-
nating forward simulation as v′. uunionsq
In order to measure the probability of a path formula to be satisfied when
the strategies from both player I and player II are fixed, we define a relation
|=./α for probabilistic executions.
Definition 3. Let G be a probabilistic game structure, E(∆) = 〈E,∆,LE , δE〉 a
probabilistic execution determined by a strategy vector piE , and ψ a path formula,
define
E(∆) |=./α ψ iff Pr∆E ({ρ ∈
⋃
s∈d∆e
G(piE , s) | ρ |= ψ}) ./ α
It is conceivable that in a probabilistic execution every finite or infinite trace
in E∗ ∪ Eω maps to a trace in G, in the way that ρ = e1e2e3 . . . is a trace in
E implies that proj(ρ) = last(e1)last(e2)last(e3) . . . is a play in G, where the
function proj projects every finite sequence of states in E into its last state in S.
Consequently, we let Pr∆E be a probabilistic measure over E
ω, such that for the
cone sets (of finite traces), we have Pr∆E (e) = ∆(last(e)), and Pr
∆
E (γ · e1 · e2) =
Pr∆E (γ · e1) · δE(e1)(e2), for γ ∈ E∗ and e1, e2 ∈ E. Let ρ be an infinite trace
in E , we write ρ |= ψ iff proj(ρ) |= ψ. Similarly, for a state formula φ and
e ∈ E, write e ∈ JφK iff last(e) ∈ JφK. In the following we study the properties of
the satisfaction relation for a probabilistic execution to satisfy a I-PATL path
formula by means of unfolding.
Lemma 17. Let φ, φ1 and φ2 be I-PATL (state) formulas, and ./∈ {>,≥} then
1. E(∆) |=./α ©φ iff there exists α′ ./ α, such that δE(∆) = ∆1 ⊕α′ ∆2 with
d∆1e ∩ d∆2e = ∅, and ∆1 |= φ.
2. E(∆) |=./α φ1U≤kφ2 iff there exists a finite sequence of triples {〈(∆i,0, αi,0),
(∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i≤j for some j ≤ k, with d∆i,`e ∩ d∆i,`′e = ∅ for
all distinct `, `′ ∈ {0, 1, 2} and 0 ≤ i ≤ j, such that
(1)
∑
i∈[0...j]
αi,1 · ∏
i′∈[0...i−1]
αi′,0
 ./ α,
(2) ∆ =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} α0,` ·∆0,`, and δE(∆i,0) =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} αi+1,` ·∆i+1,` for
all 0 ≤ i < j, (3) ∆i,0 |= φ1 and ∆i,1 |= φ2 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ j.
3. E(∆) |=./α φ1U φ2 iff there exists a finite or infinite sequence of triples
{〈(∆i,0, αi,0), (∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i<j for some j ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, with
d∆i,`e ∩ d∆i,`′e = ∅ for all distinct `, `′ ∈ {0, 1, 2} and 0 ≤ i < j, such that
(1)
∑
0≤i<j
αi,1 · ∏
i′∈[0...i−1]
αi′,0
 ./ α,
(2) ∆ =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} α0,` ·∆0,`, and δE(∆i,0) =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} αi+1,` ·∆i+1,` for
all 0 ≤ i < j, (3) ∆i,0 |= φ1 and ∆i,1 |= φ2 for all 0 ≤ i < j.
For readability we leave the proof of this lemma in the appendix.
Theorem 1. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉 be two
PGSs, vf⊆ S×D(S′) a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. If ∆vf∆′,
then G, ∆ |= φ implies G′, ∆′ |= φ for all φ ∈ LI.
Proof. (sketch) We prove by induction on the structure of a I-PATL formula φ.
Base case: suppose ∆ |= p, then s |= p for all s ∈ d∆e. By ∆vf∆′, there exists
an index set {qi}i∈I satisfying
∑
i∈I qi = 1, ∆ =
∑
i∈I qisi, ∆
′ =
∑
i∈I qi∆i,
and si vf ∆i. Therefore L(si) = L′(t) for all t ∈ d∆ie. So t |= p for all t ∈ d∆ie
for all i. Therefore ∆′ |= p. The case of ¬p is similar.
We show the case when φ = 〈〈I〉〉>αφ1Uφ2, and the proof methods for the
other PATL path constructors are just similar. Since for all t ∈ d∆′e there exists
an optimal strategy pit for the winning objective ¬φ1R¬φ2 by Lemma 2(1), and
we combine these strategies into a single strategy pi′2 satisfying pi
′
2(t·α) = pit(t·α)
for all t ∈ d∆′e and α ∈ S∗. Then pi′2 is optimal for ¬φ1R¬φ2 on ∆′. Then by
Lemma 16, there exist pi2 ∈ ΠGII and pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′
I such that E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) v
E ′(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′). Since pi1 enforces φ1Uφ2 with probability greater than α, we
have E(∆) |=>α φ1Uφ2.
Then by Lemma 17(3) there exists a finite or infinite sequence of triples
{〈(∆i,0, αi,0), (∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i<j for some j ∈ N+∪{∞} satisfying the
properties as stated in Lemma 17(3). By repetitively applying Lemma 15 we es-
tablish another sequence of triples {〈(∆′i,0, αi,0), (∆′i,1, αi,1), (∆′i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i<j ,
such that (1)
∑
0≤i<j(αi,1 ·
∏
i′∈[0...i−1] αi′,0) > α, (2) ∆
′ =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} α0,` ·∆′0,`,
and δE(∆′i,0) =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} αi+1,` · ∆′i+1,` for all 0 ≤ i < j, (3) ∆i,0vf∆′i,0 and
∆i,1vf∆′i,1 for all 0 ≤ i < j. By induction hypothesis we have ∆′i,0 |= φ1 and
∆′i,1 |= φ2 for all 0 ≤ i < j. Therefore E(∆′) |=>α φ1Uφ2 by Lemma 17(3).
Since pi′2 is an optimal strategy of II, we have ∆
′ |= 〈〈I〉〉>αφ1Uφ2 by Lemma 3.
For a formula 〈〈∅〉〉./αψ we apply the same proof strategies as for 〈〈I〉〉./αψ,
except that player I does not need to enforce ψ with a certain probability ./ α
since every probabilistic execution generated by a pair of I and II strategies will
enforce ψ with that probability. uunionsq
7 Probabilistic Alternating Bisimulation
If a probabilistic alternating simulation is symmetric, we call it a probabilistic
alternating bisimulation.
Definition 4. Consider two probabilistic game structures G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉
and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉. A probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation '⊆ S ×
S′ is a symmetric relation satisfying if s ' s′, then
– L(s) = L′(s′),
– for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that for all pi
′
2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there
exists pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(s, pi1, pi2)' δ′(s′, pi′1, pi′2),
where ' is a lifting of ' by weight functions.
Since every probabilistic alternating I-simulation is also a probabilistic al-
ternating forward I-simulation by treating the right hand side state as a point
distribution (Lemma 11), the lifted probabilistic alternating I-simulation is also a
lifted probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. This fact extends for bisim-
ulation. A probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation also preserves formulas in LI.
Moreover we write L+I for the set of formulas defined as follows, which allows
negations to appear anywhere in a formula, and further we are able to show that
probabilistic alternating bisimulation preserves all properties expressed in L+I .
φ := p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉./α© φ | 〈〈A′〉〉./αφ1U≤kφ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉>αφ1Uφ2
Theorem 2. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉 be two
PGSs, '⊆ S × S′ is a probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation. For all s ∈ S
and s′ ∈ S′ with s ' s′ and φ ∈ L+I , we have G, s |= φ iff G′, s′ |= φ.
The proof methodology basically follows that of Theorem 1, besides that when-
ever∆'∆′ and∆ |= ¬φ, we show that if there were s′ ∈ d∆e′ such that G′, s′ |= φ
then we would also have G, s |= φ for some s ∈ d∆e, which is a contradiction.
And from that we have ∆′ |= ¬φ as well.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We report our first results on probabilistic alternating simulation relations. We
have introduced two notions of simulation for probabilistic game structures –
probabilistic alternating simulation and probabilistic alternating forward simu-
lation, following the seminal works of Segala and Lynch [Seg95a,SL95] on proba-
bilistic simulation relations and the work of Alur et al. [AHKV98] on alternating
refinement relations for non-probabilistic game structures. Our main effort has
been devoted to a logical characterization for probabilistic alternating simulation
relations, by showing that they preserve a fragment of PATL formulas.
On our way to the main result, we find that the proof strategy accommo-
dated in [AHKV98] no longer applies, due to the failure in reconstructing a
strategy from sub-strategies with the existence of probabilistic behaviors. Note
that alternating simulations rely on mimicking behaviors by strategies of depth
one, while enforcing a PATL property needs to fix a general strategy (of infinite
depth) from one party regardless of any strategies of the other. We circumvent
this problem by incorporating the results of probabilistic determinacy [Mar98]
and the existence of optimal strategies [dAM04] in stochastic games.
There are several ways to proceed. We want to study the completeness of log-
ical characterization for probabilistic alternating forward simulation. It is also
of our interest to investigate the complexity for checking probabilistic alternating
simulation relations by studying the results in the literature [AHKV98,BEMC00].
Our work was partially motivated by the paper [ASW09], where PATL is used to
formalize a balanced property for a probabilistic contract signing protocol. Here,
a balanced protocol means that a dishonest participant never has a strategy to
unilaterally determine the outcome of the protocol. It is interesting to see how
much the development of simulation relations for probabilistic game structures
can help the verification of such kind of security protocols.
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A A proof of Lemma 2
The proof relies on the representation of a solution of an LTL path formula as a
winning objective in quantitative game µ-calculus [dAM04] for a two-player (I
and II) game. Its grammar is defined as follows.
φ := Q | x | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 ∧ φ2 | PpreI(φ) | PpreII(φ) | µx.φ | νx.φ
The semantics of such formulas map each formula into F , the function space
S → [0, 1]. A member f ∈ F gives an expected value f(s) for player I to win
the game on every state s ∈ S. There is a partial order defined on F in the
way that given two functions f, g ∈ F , f ≤ g if f(s) ≤ g(s) for all s ∈ S.
For Q ⊆ S, it represents a function that Q(s) = 1 if s ∈ Q and Q(s) = 0
otherwise. For conjunction and disjunction, they are defined as (f ∧ g)(s) =
min{f(s), g(s)} for all s ∈ S, and (f ∨ g)(s) = max{f(s), g(s)} for all s ∈ S.
The quantitative predecessor operator PpreI for player I and for every f ∈ F is
by PpreI(f)(s) =
⊔
pi1∈ΠI
d
pi2∈ΠII
∑
s′∈dδ(s,〈pi1,pi2〉)e δ(s, 〈pi1, pi2〉)(s′)f(s′) for all
s ∈ S. The operator PpreII can be defined in a similar way. Intuitively, based on
f , Pprei(f) gives the maximal expectation of player i on each state s after one
move, and the existence of such maximal strategy and values are guaranteed by
the minimax theorem [vNM47]. Finally, µx.φ(x) =
d{f ∈ F | φ(f) ≤ f} and
νx.φ(x) =
⊔{f ∈ F | φ(f) ≥ f}.
The existence of the optimal strategy for player I on an LTL objective can
be sketched as follows.
– For ©φ, we construct the optimal strategy from PpreI(φ) by solving a ma-
trix game on each state s ∈ S on reaching states in JφK. In this case we
only need to construct a level 1 strategy on every state, with its existence
guaranteed by the minimax theorem.
– For bounded until φ1U
≤kφ2, we do the following construction recursively
and prove the property by induction. φ1U
≤0φ2 ≡ Jφ2K works for every strat-
egy in a state in Jφ2K. For k > 0, we interpret φ1U≤kφ2 as φ2 ∨ (φ1 ∧
PpreI(φ1U
≤k−1φ2)). Then suppose there exists an optimal strategy for φ1U≤k−1φ2,
we only need to prolong the optimal strategy by one additional level, based
on the expected value already computed for φ1U
≤k−1φ2.
– The case of bounded release φ1R
≤kφ2 it can be shown in a similar way as
the above case, by letting φ1R
≤0φ2 as Jφ2K, and φ1R≤kφ2 as φ2 ∧ (φ1 ∨
PpreI(φ1R
≤k−1φ2)) for each k > 0.
– For unbounded release φ1Rφ2, our argument resembles the proof of [dAM04,
Lemma 2] on safety games. The value of the game for player I as the protag-
onist is interpreted as the function f = νx.φ2∧(φ1∨PpreI(x)), and there ex-
ists a memoryless strategy pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I for player I so that on each state s ∈ S,
pi1(s) ∈ D(ActI) is the best choice (in the matrix game on s) player I can
make according to the greatest fixed point f , i.e., for all memoryless player II
strategies pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II , we have
∑
s′∈S δ(s, pi1, pi2)(s
′) · f(s′) ≥ f(s). We show
that pi1 is the strategy that guarantees f(s) on each state s in the general
sense. Let pi2 ∈ ΠGII be an arbitrary player II strategy, and s ∈ S, we are go-
ing to show that in the probabilistic execution E(G, pi1 ∪pi2, s) = 〈E, s,L, δ〉,
we have E(s) |=≥f(s) φ1Rφ2. In order to do so, we give the following inter-
mediate result that E(s) |=≥f(s) φ1Rnφ2 for all n ∈ N.
We prove this by induction on n ∈ N that E(e) |=≥f(last(e)) φ1R≤nφ2 for all
e ∈ E. By abuse of the notation we treat pi1 also as a general strategy such
that pi1(γ) = pi1(last(γ)) for all γ ∈ S+. We also write pie2 as the “truncated”
strategy of pi2, by defining pi
e
2(s · γ) = pi2(e · γ) for all s ∈ S and γ ∈ S+. To
simplify notation we write PreE(pi1, pi2, ψ) for Pr
e
E({ρ ∈ G((pi1, pi2), last(e)) |
ρ |= ψ}).
Base case: let e ∈ E, n = 0 and φ1R≤0φ2 ≡ φ2, we have PreE(pi1, pie2, φ1R≤0φ2) =
1 ≥ f(last(e)) = 1 if last(e) ∈ Jφ2K, and PreE(pi1, pie2, φ1R≤0φ2) = 0 ≥
f(last(e)) = 0 otherwise.
Suppose this holds up to level n, we need to show the case of n+ 1.
• If last(e) ∈ J¬φ2K, then PreE(pi1, pie2, φ1R≤n+1φ2) = 0 ≥ f(last(e)).
• If last(e) ∈ Jφ2K ∩ Jφ1K, then PreE(pi1, pie2, φ1R≤n+1φ2) = 1 ≥ f(last(e)).
• If last(e) ∈ Jφ2K∩J¬φ1K, then PreE(pi1, pie2, φ1R≤n+1φ2) =∑e′∈dδ(e)e δ(e)(e′)·
Pre
′
E (pi1, pi
e′
2 , φ1R
≤nφ2). By I.H., Pre
′
E (pi1, pi
e′
2 , φ1R
≤nφ2) ≥ f(last(e′)), we
have PreE(pi1, pi
e
2, φ1R
≤n+1φ2) ≥
∑
e′∈dδ(e)e δ(e)(e
′) · f(last(e′)).
By definition we have f(last(e))
=
d
pi′∈ΠG,1II
∑
s′∈δ(last(e),pi1,pi′) δ(last(e), pi1, pi
′)(s′)f(s′)
≤∑s′∈δ(last(e),pi1,pi2) δ(last(e), pi1, pi2)(s′)f(s′)
=
∑
e′∈dδ(e)e δ(e)(e
′) · f(last(e′)).
The last equivalence is by definition of E(G, pi1 ∪ pi2, s). The result im-
mediately follows.
PrsE(pi1, pi2, φ1Rφ2) = limn→∞ Pr
s
E(pi1, pi2, φ1R
nφ2), we have Pr
s
E(pi1, pi2, φ1Rφ2) ≥
f(s). Since pi2 is arbitrarily chosen, we have pi1 is a player I strategy that
enforces φ1Rφ2 with probability at least f(s). Moreover, since s is arbitrarily
chosen, pi1 is optimal on s for all s ∈ S.
The existence of -optimal strategies for φ1Uφ2 for all  > 0 is guaranteed by the
existence of -optimal strategies for all ω-regular winning objectives, as shown
in [dAM04].
B A proof sketch of Lemma 17
1. Define the set {s ∈ dδE(∆)e | s |= φ}. Now it is obvious that for all infinite
run ρ ∈ Eω, ρ |=©φ iff ρ(1) |= φ. The result immediately follows.
2. The proof this item is similar to the below in its finite case.
3. Given the probabilistic execution E(∆), intuitively, each e ∈ E represents
a finite run within E(∆). We construct as follows a maximal sequence of
triples {〈(∆i,0, αi,0), (∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉} for i ∈ N.
For all e ∈ E, we define Ei,1 = {e ∈ E | e = s1s2 . . . si, si |= φ2, sj |=
φ1 for all j < i}, and Ei,0 = {e ∈ E | e = s1s2 . . . si, sj |= φ1 for all j ≤ i}.
Intuitively, Ei,1 are the prefixes of those runs that satisfy φ1Uφ2, and Ei,1
are the prefixes of the runs that might satisfy φ1Uφ2.
Further we define ∆0 = ∆ and E0,2 = d∆0e \ (E0,0 ∪ E0,1), and α0,` =
∆0(E0,`) for ` ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Then for each i ∈ N, recursively define ∆i+1 =
δ(∆i,0), Ei+1,2 = d∆i+1e \ (Ei+1,0 ∪ Ei+1,1), αi+1,` = ∆i+1(Ei+1,`) for all
` ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Consequently, we have ∆i,`(e) = ∆i(e)/αi,` if e ∈ Ei,` and 0
otherwise, for all i ∈ N and ` ∈ {0, 1, 2}, provided αi,` 6= 0. If αi,` = 0 we let
∆i,` be empty, i.e., it assigns every e ∈ E to 0.
It is easily verifiable that d∆i,`e ∩ d∆i,`′e = ∅ for all distinct `, `′ ∈ {0, 1, 2},
since Ei,`∩Ei,`′ = ∅. Also for all i ∈ N we have (2) δE(∆i,0) =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} αi+1,`·
∆i+1,`, and (3) ∆i,0 |= φ1 and ∆i,2 |= φ2 for all i.
For every infinite run ρ ∈ Eω, we have ρ |= φ1Uφ2 iff there exists a prefix
e ∈ Ei,1 for some i ∈ N. Therefore we have Pr∆E ({ρ ∈ Eω | ρ |= φ1Uφ2}) ./ α
iff
∑
i∈N(αi,1·
∏
0≤j<i αj,0) for ./∈ {>,≥}, which is (1). That is, the collection
of infinite traces satisfying φ1Uφ2 are those with prefix e0e1 . . . ei with ei |= φ2
and ej |= φ1 for all 0 ≤ j < i. Therefore, suppose E(∆) |=./ φ1Uφ2, we have
that the above sequence of triples {〈(∆i,0, αi,0), (∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉}i∈N
satisfies the required conditions (1), (2) and (3).
Suppose there exists a sequence of triples satisfying (1), (2) and (3) with
respect to ./ α, due to a similar way of reasoning, we already collected
enough infinite runs that satisfy φ1Uφ2 with probability ./ α for ./∈ {>,≥}.
